A rude awakening for Europe only strengthens Western security

Published in The Australian, 23 February 2026.

Europe is having a family quarrel with America. It’s noisy, emotive, and at times undignified. But if you strip away the theatre, there’s a hard truth: the West is not breaking apart. It is being asked to grow up.

For decades, Europe has lived with a strategic comfort blanket: the United States would carry the bulk of the load, and European leaders could spend political capital elsewhere. Welfare states expanded. Defence was trimmed. Industrial capacity hollowed out. Energy dependency was rationalised as pragmatism. Meanwhile, the security dividend was treated as a permanent entitlement, not the temporary windfall it always was.

Now Washington has turned up and said: the bill is due.

A year ago, JD Vance’s blunt message in Munich landed like an insult. It was deliberately confrontational. It was also overdue. Many Europeans heard only the tone, not the substance. The substance was this: Europe is wealthy, capable, and strategically exposed. It must assume primary responsibility for its own security in its own theatre, and it must do it at pace. 

These demands were re-cast in European capitals as a repudiation of NATO, or worse, appeasement of Vladimir Putin. This is nonsense. NATO isn’t being abandoned. It’s being strengthened and rebalanced. And in the real world, rebalance is what keeps alliances alive.

Alliances don’t survive on sentiment. They survive on contribution, credibility, shared purpose and shared effort. When the distribution of costs becomes too lopsided for too long, the alliance corrodes from within. Resentment builds. Domestic politics catches up. And then everyone is surprised when the guarantor starts asking hard questions.

America has hard questions. It has an opioid crisis killing more Americans than most wars. It has border pressures that cut to the heart of social cohesion. It has industrial constraints that limit sustained military production. And it has a strategic contest in the Indo-Pacific that will define the balance of power for the rest of this century.

In that environment, expecting the United States to underwrite Europe’s security indefinitely, while Europe debates, delays, and under-invests, is not a strategy the US could credibly continue. 

Europe is not defenceless. It is not poor. It is not incapable. The European Union’s combined economic weight is enormous. Its technological base is deep. Its human capital is outstanding. What it has lacked is political will and urgency, especially after the Cold War, when too many leaders convinced themselves history had ended and hard power could be subcontracted.

Ukraine shattered that illusion. Yet even after February 2022, the response remained uneven. Europe did more, but it did not do enough, quickly enough. Ammunition production lagged. Stockpiles were thin. Defence procurement remained fragmented. Energy policy, in places, bordered on self-harm.

Then came the Trump Administration’s bucket of old  water to wake them up. No gentle alarm clock. No comforting speeches about shared values while the Americans carry the kit. Instead: meet higher spending targets; build real capability; take the lead in your theatre; and assume responsibility for supporting Ukraine and any subsequent peace.

Predictably, Europe bristled. It always does when America tells it uncomfortable truths, especially when they do not like the messenger. But here’s the part many commentators miss: after the outrage, Europe moved.

NATO’s commitments have shifted. Defence spending targets have risen. At Munich this year, European leaders were talking seriously about integrating their defence industrial base, accelerating dual-use technologies, and lifting interoperability across platforms. Britain spoke of candidly moving from over-dependence to interdependence. France is again raising questions of European nuclear cooperation and collective deterrence.

Iin response to Secretary Rubio’s speech this year at Munich, which basically said the same thing as Vance’s only in gentler tones, he was given a standing ovation and thanked for providing reassurance.

All of this is now being sold in Europe as “strategic autonomy” and independence from an unreliable America. If that helps European leaders get through their day and gain support from their parliaments, fine. But let’s not kid ourselves: it is precisely the outcome Washington has been demanding. The one they cast as the villain, is the same person that shunted them into action, namely President Trump. 

This is where you see the difference between headlines and history. The headlines say ‘Trump rupture”. History will say “US leadership”.

There will be capability gaps Europe must fill - missile defence. strategic airlift. ISR, particularly space-based surveillance and targeting, munitions at scale and  cyber resilience. Defence production lines must also be able to surge in crisis, not just meet peacetime budgets. These are not glamorous debates, but they are the difference between deterrence and disaster.

Europe can do this. Europe must do this.

In Australia, we have a direct interest in a stronger Europe.  A Europe that takes primary responsibility for it’s own theatre frees up American capacity. It reduces the temptation for adversaries to probe weak seams. If the United States is stretched thin across the globe, deterrence weakens everywhere. That is precisely what Beijing wants in the Indo-Pacific.

If Europe believes they are being unfairly singled out, don’t fret, the United States is asking similar questions of us in Australia. As an Indo-Pacific ally at the centre of the century’s decisive theatre, Washington expects greater effort, greater urgency and greater capability from its closest partners.

Despite receiving strong support for AUKUS from two Administrations, it is not a blank cheque. Defense spending at 3% of GDP by 2030 and 3.5% by 2035 should be our minimum commitment. The US will also continue to mark our homework, and so they should. This year’s federal defence budget will be watched closely in Washington. 

While stressing that alliances are valued, the US makes no apologies for making greater demands upon them. That is not cynicism or abandoning a world order that favours freedom. It’s realism. And a realism that will keep free nations free.

Yes, the Trump Administration’s execution has been rough at times. Some statements have been needlessly provocative. But don’t confuse style with substance. The strategic intent is clear: strengthen the alliance by forcing burden sharing, rebuild industrial capability, and prioritise the theatres that will decide the next century.

In time, the noise will fade. The structural shift will remain.

Europe will spend more. Build more. Produce more. Field more. And take more responsibility. That will make it a better ally, not a bitter one, with shared civilisation providing every reason for them to stand together with the US.

The West isn’t ending. It’s being tested. And tests, if met, are how strength is renewed.

Hon. Scott Morrison  was the 30th Prime Minister of Australia from 2018-2022 and is Vice Chair of American Global Strategies, a Washington based geo-political advisory firm.