Why the Defense of Taiwan Matters
Article published in The National Interest, 17 October 2025.
The defense of Taiwan matters morally, strategically, and historically. It embodies hope, freedom, and democracy in a region where all are under strain.
Preserving the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is not a niche concern that can be dismissed as someone else’s problem. Whether you’re in New York, Sydney, Tokyo, or Taipei, Taiwan matters. It is a threshold issue for regional peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and every nation that values its own sovereignty, security, and freedom.
For those in the West tempted to stay out and “not poke the dragon,” let’s call that what it is: appeasement disguised as prudence. If Taiwan were to be forced under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the consequences would not stop at the island’s shoreline. They would crash through global markets, alliances, and supply chains, reshaping the balance of power for decades to come. It would make the global economic shutdown triggered by COVID-19 seem like a sneeze.
As prime minister of Australia, I sought to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships such as AUKUS to deepen collective deterrence against the CCP’s ambitions to impose regional hegemony. From that experience, four truths stand out.
First, Taiwan’s future directly shapes our own. Preserving the status quo is not an act of altruism or convenience. It is essential to collective security and prosperity. The stakes are far greater than the price of semiconductors or even the survival of a vibrant democracy of 24 million people.
If Taiwan were to fall, the Indo-Pacific’s strategic geometry would shift overnight. The first island chain, which contains Chinese military might, would be broken, pushing US forces back to the second island chain and weakening their ability to provide an effective regional counterbalance. A CCP-controlled Taiwan would allow the People’s Liberation Army to project its air, naval, missile, cyber, and space-based power through the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait into the Philippine Sea.
Maritime and air traffic between Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia would pass through effectively Chinese-controlled space. Peacetime harassment would become routine and crisis-time interdiction absolute. Missile arcs from Taiwan would push deep into the Western Pacific. Undersea sensors and anti-submarine aircraft would enable Beijing to track US and allied submarines as they transit the Luzon Strait. Japan’s and Korea’s energy sea lanes would be exposed to coercion, while subsea cables near Taiwan, the arteries of the digital economy, could be tapped or severed.
Second, a conflict over Taiwan would devastate everyone, including China. Once it begins, no one can simply reset the board. Even a “successful” invasion or blockade would inflict enormous military and economic losses, degrading the PLA’s capability and crippling China’s economy for years. The belief that a blockade might be a benign alternative is a dangerous illusion. A blockade is an act of war that is likely to escalate, resulting in massive losses for both sides. Sanctions would come first, but in such a compressed battlespace, one miscalculation could turn confrontation into conflagration overnight.
Third, neither Washington nor Beijing has the bandwidth for a major war, yet. China’s leadership faces immense internal challenges: a collapsing property market, shrinking demographics, and the painful transition from debt-fueled, producer-led growth to consumer-led sustainability. The Chinese middle class has suffered intergenerational wealth destruction, and consumer confidence has collapsed. Rather than shift to household demand, Beijing has doubled down on overproduction, just as the United States and Europe are raising trade walls and tariffs.
US tariffs under President Trump are forcing China to divert exports to Southeast Asia, India, and the EU. Still, these markets are already pushing back with anti-dumping actions, especially against subsidized electric vehicles. At the same time, US tariffs on goods from Vietnam and Mexico are reorganizing supply chains away from China, undermining its indirect access to Western markets. Manufacturing remains sluggish, deflationary forces persist, and household consumption is weak. China may yet navigate this transition, but its capacity to bankroll external aggression will not be what it has been in the past. Overextending in Taiwan now could prove existential if it fails.
The United States, meanwhile, has its own challenges to contend with. Ukraine, the Middle East, the war on drugs in Latin America, domestic political volatility, landing bilateral trade deals, court challenges, and civil unrest make for a busy presidential schedule. That said, President Trump’s unconventional approach, which sows uncertainty in the minds of adversaries, combined with an evolving “peace through strength” posture, will likely deter any hasty action from Beijing while he is in office. Also, despite the CCP’s performative rhetoric, it is not in the US or China’s interest to conflate the status of Taiwan into the economic discussions on trade.
Fourth, resilience and deterrence must be accelerated, militarily, economically, technologically, and psychologically.
Militarily, Taiwan must double down on asymmetric denial—rather than pursuing parity with Chinese forces—to cripple invasion forces within the first 72 hours. That requires higher defense spending well above current levels and bipartisan unity to sustain it, which is currently lacking. Taiwan’s collaboration with the United States on missiles, launchers, and drones is progressing, but its volume, stockpiling, and indigenous production capabilities remain insufficient.
Civil resilience is equally vital. Taiwan must harden its energy infrastructure, re-engage nuclear energy capacity prudently, diversify LNG supply, and protect key infrastructural nodes from cyber and physical attacks. In the space domain, it must eliminate single-provider satellite dependence, deploy high-altitude relay platforms to backstop undersea cables, expand earth-observation capacity, and harden and increase the mobility of ground control stations. Access to rapid launch and replenishment, potentially through allied sites in the United States, Japan, and Australia, is essential.
Above all, Taiwan and its partners must win the information war. Taiwan is today’s West Berlin. The Berlin Airlift succeeded because the free world understood what was at stake. The same must be true now. Taiwan should demonstrate and communicate its determination to defend itself and why it matters. Allies should amplify that story not only in Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo but across Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Global South. Strategic ambiguity is US policy; strategic silence should not be our narrative.
For now, the strategic calculus for a blockade or invasion does not add up for Beijing. But that can change fast. To preserve peace, we must build the capacity and the coalition to keep it. That means preparing now, not debating later, and ensuring Beijing understands beyond any doubt that the cost of aggression would be catastrophic, not only for Taiwan, but for China itself.
