Address, Australian Space Summit
“Australia’s Role in an Allied Global Space Network”
27 May 2025
Sydney, Australia
In September 2019, I stood on the South Lawn of the White House with President Trump and spoke of the enduring relationship between the United States and Australia. I recalled more than a century of mateship, where our nations had worked together to achieve the better world we believed in, whether on the battlefield or other theatres.
In that spirit, the following day at NASA Headquarters in Washington DC, I announced that this partnership would once again take us into space, with Australia investing AU$150 million over five years (2020–2025) to support Australian businesses and researchers to participate in NASA's Artemis programme. This included:
$50 million for the Trailblazer Programme to develop an Australian-made lunar rover.
More than $40 million for demonstrator space projects, including robotics, automation, satellite communications, remote medicine applications, and propulsion technologies for international missions and supply chains.
Over $25 million in grains to strengthen the capability of Australian companies to be part of the Artemis supply chain.
These programmes were part of a broader commitment by my Government to grow Australia’s space industry. As many of you here would know this included:
Creation and funding of the Australian Space Agency in Adelaide,
Establishment of the SmartSat CRC with $55 million over seven years, focusing on telecommunications, intelligent satellite systems, and next-generation Earth observation, and becoming Australia’s largest space research collaboration, involving over 100 partners from industry, government, and academia, and has attracted a further $190 million in co-investment,
$225 million over four years to Geoscience Australia for the National Positioning Infrastructure Capability (NPIC) to modernise and expand the Australian Regional GNSS Network (ARGN), integrating over 700 continuously operating reference stations (CORS) from 11 operators to provide centimetre-level positioning accuracy across mobile coverage areas, supporting agriculture, mining, construction, and surveying,
$1.2 billion in March 2022 to the National Space Mission for Earth Observation (NSMEO) to develop four Earth observation satellites, enhancing Australia’s sovereign ability to collect critical environmental data, that would have supported applications in weather forecasting, disaster response, environmental management, and agricultural planning, and
Over $300 million to build out our astronomy research infrastructure, by developing the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) in Western Australia for deep space observation.
Our investments were not limited to the civil and scientific spheres. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Posture Review marked a strategic shift, formally recognising for the first time space as a warfighting domain. This acknowledged the increasing role of space in military operations and repositioned the ADF from a passive consumer to an active, sovereign space contributor. We committed $7 billion over a decade to develop sovereign space capabilities, including:
Satellite communications through JP9102, establishing sovereign-controlled constellations and ground stations for secure ADF communications,
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through JP9360 to enhance space-based imagery capabilities,
Space Domain Awareness (SDA), including hosting US assets like the C-band radar and Space Surveillance Telescope in WA,
Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services to ensure the ADF's operational effectiveness in contested environments where global navigation satellite systems may be compromised, and
Space control and electronic warfare capabilities, that can counter emerging space threats, ensuring the ADF's freedom of operation in space, including the JP9358 programme to explore non-kinetic electronic warfare options to protect Australia's space interests.
This was supported by the establishment in 2022 of Defence Space Command under the RAAF to coordinate operations and integration across each of the services. Partnerships with allies, industry, and academia were also critical, leveraging Australia’s geography, especially for SDA operations.
After the 2022 election, some of these programmes were discontinued by the new government, including NSMEO and several supply chain and infrastructure initiatives, citing new budget priorities. JP9102 was also cancelled in favour of seeking a more resilient multi-orbit architecture, still to be defined, while JP9360 and JP9358 have reportedly been merged.
Newly elected Governments have the right to set new priorities, especially where they have access to new information.
However, other initiatives were continued and built upon. Notably, the AUKUS-style trilateral MoU for the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC), agreed in September 2023, utilising the US radar installations at Exmouth. The DARC system, capable of detecting and characterising objects in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), is critical to protecting space assets. The first site in Exmouth was completed in December 2024 and will be operational by 2026. Additional DARC sites will follow in the UK and US by decade’s end.
Despite some setbacks we must appreciate what has been achieved. Our task now, as the new parliamentary term begins, is to reset, move forward and make the strategic case for a bipartisan commitment to space, driven by our national interests, just like intelligence, security and defence.
And the case is stronger and more compelling than ever, especially from an economic and national security perspective.
McKinsey estimates the global space economy is now worth US$630 billion and will grow 9% annually to US$1.8 trillion by 2035, double the growth rate of the global economy and faster than semiconductors. The expected growth in the global satellite population bears this out.
There are currently 12,000 active satellites. This is projected to reach 17,000–27,000 by 2030, 40,000 by 2035, and over 60,000 by 2040. Key drivers include SpaceX (targeting 42,000 satellites), Amazon's Project Kuiper (3,236), and China’s Guowang (13,000+).
In security terms, the urgency is more compelling. Space is now a frontline in the US-China strategic rivalry that now dominates our post globalisation world. The blurred lines between civil and military domains created by the dual use space technologies makes this even more challenging to contest.
To obtain control and even dominance in the space domain, major powers are developing both offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive systems include kinetic ASATs, electronic jamming, lasers, and cyberattacks. Defensive measures involve SSA networks, encrypted SatCom, constellations, and reconstitution strategies.
The US leads with the most mature infrastructure, advanced SSA capabilities, hardened satellite networks, and early warning systems. The "golden dome" initiative will elevate these capabilities further.
The US also dominates the civil space sector — via SpaceX’s Starlink (three-quarters of all active satellites) as well as reusable rockets, and sovereign launch capabilities, including ground infrastructure that was predominantly developed by Government. But China is advancing, especially in satellite manoeuvrability, launch, and spaceplane tech.
The recent 2025 Space Threat Assessment report prepared by the CSIS Aerospace Project noted the following advances in Chinese capabilities in the past few years:
A Chinese satellite was tracked during the last year maneuvering at 44 metres per second, unusually high and using significantly more fuel than the more standard range for repositioning satellites in GEO.
The PRC has already fielded ground-based laser weapons capable of blinding or damaging satellites and conducted research on mobile high-powered microwave weapons for general military applications.
China’s Shenlong space plane has released, manoeuvred with, and possibly captured an object before returning to Earth.
Three tech demonstrator satellites conducted cork-screw maneuvers around another satellite with potential signals collection capability, and
Chinese satellites conducted RPO (rendezvous and proximity operations) with the closest approach distance less than 1 km, which is essentially face-to-face for satellites traveling at around 17,000 mph, akin to “dogfighting” in space
Meanwhile Russia engages in jamming and spoofing GPS signals on Earth, has proven space and terrestrial ASAT capabilities and is reportedly developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon.
In March this year General Stephen Whiting, Commander, United States Space Command testified before the Senate Armed Services Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces that “today, we face concurrent and accelerating threats … they span terrestrial, on-orbit, and cyber capabilities holding space systems in all orbital regimes at risk, capable of restricting Joint Force freedom of action in all domains and attacking the homeland with little warning”.
He said “the increasing lethality and proliferation of space-enabled and cyber threats … demonstrate that winning the space fight is foundational to defending the nation, the readiness of the nation’s forces, and reestablishing deterrence”.
As space becomes ever more enmeshed in geopolitical rivalry, the allied network must function as a cohesive whole, just as it has in all other domains for decades. Each member brings strengths: the US — raw scale, capacity and technology, Europe and the UK — sophisticated systems and strategic culture, Japan — regional expertise and technical prowess, and Australia — a unique geography that has also created bespoke innovation capabilities.
While China and Russia pose serious challenges with their counterspace arsenals, the combined resources and unity of the US and its allies provide a strong counterweight. Australia’s emergence in this domain, in concert with Japan and Europe/UK, enhances that counterweight by increasing redundancy and coverage.
Australia can and must stand out as a rising actor with the potential to plug important holes in allied capabilities. By 2030, with deliberate development, Australia can offer unique contributions: southern-hemisphere sensors watching the skies, a strategic location for space operations, and additional resilient satellites and launch options that complement US, Japanese, and European/UK systems.
Australia’s strongest path is through alignment and integration, building on Five Eyes trust, AUKUS innovation, and QUAD cooperation, to ensure its new capabilities add value to the collective deterrence and defence in space and position Australia as a critical lynchpin of a resilient allied space architecture.
The emerging consensus of where Australia should focus its efforts reflects the priorities we pursued in Government:
Enhance SSA Infrastructure, by continuing to build world-class SSA sensors in Australia — radars, telescopes, and possibly space-based sensors — and fully integrate these with US and allied networks (e.g. through the AUKUS DARC initiative) to provide unique southern hemisphere coverage and high-fidelity tracking of potential threats.
Develop Sovereign SatCom by bringing on, as an urgent priority, the replacement for JP9102 military satcoms to field at least one hardened, high-throughput communications satellite, ensuring interoperability with US and UK systems so that allied forces can cross-connect if needed.
Support development of sovereign launch infrastructure that takes advantage of Australia’s unique geography for equatorial and polar launch, to aid responsive launch and satellite reconstitution and expand available capacity for heavy launch in secure jurisdictions and serve as a backup launch site for rapid replacement of critical satellites during a crisis – enhancing overall allied resilience.
Develop collaborative Satellite Projects, by pursuing joint development of small satellite constellations with allies. For example, an AUS-JPN microsatellite constellation for maritime surveillance, or an AUS-UK telecom smallsat project, sharing costs and tech. Such collaboration yields interoperable systems and demonstrates alliance solidarity in space investment.
Strengthen Space Resilience and Defence by firming cyber protection of all space-related assets (satellites, ground stations, communication links) and work with Five Eyes partners to share threat intelligence on cyber and EMP/laser threats. There must also be contingency plans for when allied satellites are attacked, to enable Australian assets fill gaps.
By executing these steps, Australia will evolve from a supportive “receiver” of allied space support to a net contributor of space security. It will fill critical gaps – geographical and technological – in the alliance architecture. In practical terms, an allied operation in the Indo-Pacific in 2030 could count on Australian satellites for communications and surveillance, Australian sensors to warn of enemy ASAT moves, and even Australian launch pads to rapidly deploy new assets. All of this augments the strengths of the US, Japan, and Europe/UK, creating a more robust collective space posture that deters aggression.
A strong argument can also be made that such initiatives could form the basis of Australia’s contribution to a new pillar 3 for AUKUS which, as its founder, I would strongly support.
A Pillar 3 for AUKUS to develop combined space capabilities would:
Recognise and elevate the strategic importance of the space domain to address the shared security objectives of AUKUS partners,
Enhance the deterrent effect of the AUKUS partnership,
Recognise and harness the important role played by the private sector in the space domain in AUKUS jurisdictions to deliver strategic advantage over potential adversaries, that is central to the AUKUS philosophy,
Support the creation of a more integrated regulatory and commercial ecosystem for space capability development and operations,
Provide a new platform to engage with Non-AUKUS partners through QUAD and NATO in the space domain building on existing initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness and the Multi national force; Operation Olympic Defender.
In Australia it would also foster a more whole of Government approach to the development of our space sector, by recognising its broader strategic importance, and weaving together policy and programmes across portfolios.
At Space Centre Australia we are working to play our part in such a programme. James Palmer’s vision for SCA is infectious and inspiring. I am pleased to be working with him on this truly nation building project.
Our plans to develop a multi user private space port near Weipa in Cape York, takes advantage of our unique 12 degree south location and remote geography. This will enable the development of a comprehensive space port facility that can support the full spectrum of launch requirements and missions. It will be Kennedy 2.0 or Cape Canaveral at Cape York. It will be an extraordinary asset not just for Australia, but our broader network of allies and partners. There is no other space port in a secure jurisdiction planned or existing, at this scale, closer to the equator. Together with the supporting infrastructure, including manufacturing facilities, radars, ground stations, data centres, innovation labs and mission control it will provide a central point of gravity for Australia’s future space ecosystem.
We are also securing important partnerships needed to make this vision a reality, including our Space Act agreement with NASA, our first launch partner H-Star or most importantly our indigenous partners the Mokwiri.
Above all of this, at SCA we are particularly excited about the role we can play in guaranteeing an economic future for the Cape communities and far north Queensland more broadly, especially our local indigenous communities.
More than infrastructure, this is a catalyst for prosperity in Far North Queensland. Indigenous communities will be at the heart of the project’s long-term economic and social impact.
Having left politics, I’m proud to continue pursuing what I’ve long believed to be a national priority — the development of Australia’s space capability. It was never about politics — it was about securing Australia’s economic, scientific and strategic future.
I still believe in that future — and I’m committed to helping realise it.
