Address, London Defence Conference
“Countering CRINK”
9 May 2025
London, United Kingdom
A new arc of autocracy
An arc of autocracy has emerged among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea (CRINK), exhibiting increased collaboration in the diplomatic, economic and military spheres. It presents a real threat to global stability and security, especially in key regional theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific.
CRINK’s collaboration is primarily transactional in nature and not held together by any underlying ideology or even shared history. It is fundamentally about resisting global influences and pressures that seek to constrain what they wish to do and how they wish to do it, especially within their own sovereign jurisdictions and regions.
CRINK collaboration is driven by advancing a set of shared interests that seek to:
Ensure security and perpetuity of their autocratic regimes to act with impunity.
Establish regional hegemony as a buffer to regime security.
Weaken and neutralise the ability of global systems, institutions and norms to place constraints on their exercise of power and economic activity, especially domestically and regionally, and
Push back against the influence of US allies and partners at regional and global levels.
CRINK nations work together in three principal ways:
Military Cooperation enhances their collective military capabilities, complicating Western defence strategies (exercises, interoperability).
Economic Collaboration undermines the effectiveness of sanctions and creates alternative economic networks (sanction busting, supply chain creation and manipulation, economic lifelines, financial system resilience).
Diplomatic alignment presents a united front in international forums, challenging Western influence, norms, diplomatic and global institutional narratives.
CRINK collaboration has most obviously and significantly been demonstrated in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, but also more recently through tacit support for Iran’s proxy conflicts in the Middle East.
Also, most recently:
In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, including a mutual defence clause,
In March 2025, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu chaired a meeting with Russian and Iranian counterparts to strengthen trilateral cooperation,
Also this year, Iran, China and Russia conducted joint naval exercises, “Security Belt-2025,” in the Gulf of Oman, demonstrating military cooperation.
And this week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made his 11th trip since 2013 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. According to an official statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the goal is to “deepen political mutual trust” and “promote practical cooperation in various fields.” It is reported this will possibly include an agreement to build the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, channelling Russian natural gas to China.
Are other countries likely to join the CRINK network?
Other nations with authoritarian regimes or anti-Western sentiments are at risk of gravitating toward this bloc, seeking similar support and solidarity, in the form of military aid, economic partnerships such as BRI, and diplomatic backing.
Others, who feel excluded or constrained by the global financial and economic system, or ignored when it comes to addressing their human development and environmental challenges, are also at risk of being incentivised by CRINK through similar inducements.
Then there are those who will effectively be neutralised for the purpose of supporting the actions of US allies and partners to counter the influence of the CRINK arc of autocracy, because they simply don’t wish to be placed in a position where they have to choose.
Each of these trends is exacerbated by increasing Global South indifference and agnosticism regarding the principles and values that have underpinned and motivated Western civilisation and the post-WWII global framework, which is effectively now under attack from within.
What military threat do CRINK nations collectively present to global security?
CRINK nations increasingly complement each other, no less significantly than in their combined military capabilities that are changing the global security calculus, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
In Ukraine we have witnessed this through:
China: Providing economic support and dual-use technologies, bolstering Russia’s war economy.
Iran: Supplying drones and missiles, enhancing Russia’s strike capabilities.
North Korea: Reportedly sending over 15,000 troops and substantial munitions, directly aiding Russian forces.
This collaboration is occurring as we see CRINK nations, especially China, rapidly closing the gap and achieving superiority in several domains compared to the US and its allies. For China, this is particularly the case in terms of naval shipbuilding, naval forces (largest navy in the world by hull count, 370+, including three aircraft carriers, SSNs and SSBNs), hypersonics, missile saturation, combat drone deployment, swarming tactics for A2/AD zones, space launch and ASAT capability, electronic warfare and cyber—where integration of civilian tech, AI, and doctrinal speed is also a cause for concern.
Locally, China can also rapidly deploy 300,000 troops (out of a wider active and reserve force of 2.5 million), compared to around 80,000 available to INDOPACOM. Within the Indo-Pacific, China can also deny air and naval access more effectively than any other peer adversary, out-ranging many US and allied legacy platforms.
Russia’s strength lies in its nuclear deterrent with the world’s largest stockpile, large conventional forces and hypersonics. Russia’s undersea nuclear deterrent remains potent, but their surface fleet is ageing and suffering losses. Russia is also a leading space force with tested ASAT weapons; space surveillance and counter-space operations. Russia also has proven cyber sabotage and disinformation operations (e.g. Ukraine, NotPetya).
Iran and North Korea focus on asymmetric, cyber and missile-based disruptions, but increasingly embolden larger powers. They are also intentional.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to emphasise the need to further develop Iran’s military capabilities to deter threats from the US and Israel. Iran is technically near breakout capability on nuclear weapons—with over 60% enrichment—but lacks a tested device.
Leader Kim Jong Un has urged increased artillery shell production to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, aligning with Moscow’s military objectives and reportedly deployed 15,000 troops to assist their cause.
Despite the advances in CRINK military capabilities, the US together with its allies still maintain overall advanced technological and strategic superiority in nearly all critical areas. This includes fifth-generation fighters, nuclear deterrent, deep-sea and carrier operations, high-end autonomous systems, depth and integration of cyber defences, orbital space operations and space launch capacity.
Also, after defending freedom and fighting tyranny and authoritarianism together for more than a century, the US and its allies have the clear superiority in experienced interoperability, integration and institutional trust across their combined forces, as well as between civil, scientific, diplomatic and military spheres. Western allies and partners have simply been to war together more often, more recently, and have engaged in more integrated defence planning and operations longer than their CRINK adversaries.
The bottom line is that the US and its allies maintain a qualitative edge in nearly all advanced defence technologies. However, China is closing the gap in several domains—particularly naval, hypersonic and UAV—and is being complemented by the absolute and asymmetric capabilities of their autocratic partners.
How should US allies and partners respond to CRINK?
Essential elements for an effective response to push back against the assertions, ambition and aggression of the CRINK network must include:
An integrated deterrence focus on denial: increasing the military, economic and diplomatic cost calculus upon adversaries contemplating hostile, violent and aggressive actions against peaceful states and undermining a rules-based order that favours freedom globally and regionally.
Utilise economic leverage as the lead active offensive measure to deter the negative actions of CRINK adversaries. This requires enhancing the effectiveness and restoring the legitimacy of global sanctions frameworks.
Value, deepen, strengthen, focus, purpose and operationalise the multiple webs of US allies and partners in all spheres—military, diplomatic, economic—AUKUS, QUAD, NATO—to expose, resist, push back and disrupt the influence, aggression and assertions of autocratic states.
Maintain and build advanced global tech superiority and enhance projection capability to counter local regional superiority of autocratic states, especially the PRC.
Strengthen and harden forward deployment, enhance early warning and strike capabilities to address priority threats—especially posed by China in the Indo-Pacific, particularly Taiwan and the South China Sea. This includes ISR capabilities to detect mobilisation; boosting stockpiles and support for rapid operational deployment, F-35 basing and rapid rearmament infrastructure, and sustainment lines (fuel, munitions, and spare parts).
Build and support regional asymmetric deterrence capabilities of allies within the region—especially Taiwan and the Philippines.
Embrace and foster the development of an integrated allied defence industrial base and logistics capability with a particular focus on
Shipbuilding
Rare earths and critical minerals processing,
Missile production to rebuild stockpiles,
Design and manufacture of advanced chip making technologies, and
Manufacture of low-grade autonomous offensive weapons and systems — especially swarming capabilities, and at scale.
Enhance and harden Space presence to increase domain awareness, deny and deter adversarial activity through counter-offensive capabilities, and ensure guaranteed access to space through expanded, diversified and accessible allied multi-user launch facilities.
Do not forget nor forsake other continuing threats to global and regional security — namely hostile non-state actors, including terrorism and extremism, as well as economic and environmental impacts in developing economies that can exacerbate vulnerability to autocratic influence.
What about Taiwan more specifically?
In the Indo-Pacific theatre China possesses a strong local regional advantage in denial and deterrence, especially in naval and hypersonic capabilities, and industrial base sustainment, enabling them to increasing power projection.
Xi has been clear about his intent to have the capability to retake Taiwan by 2027, but has not indicated a clear intent to exercise that capability. This is driven by China’s preference to avoid the significant cost of a hot conflict and unite Taiwan by draining Taiwanese and US-led global resistance and patience through unrelenting tactics of coercion and intimidation.
As recently as March 2025, China conducted large-scale military drills around Taiwan, simulating blockades and amphibious assaults.
To deter a proactive invasion or even military blockade requires retaining a prohibitive calculus for China on initiating a hot conflict, as is often said, for Xi to wake up each morning and continue to say “not today.”
This requires the US and its Indo-Pacific allies — especially Australia, Japan, ROK and the Philippines — to sustain and enhance their coordinated military deterrent, as well as fortifying their political resilience to upholding the status quo as provided for under the One China policies affirmed by the US and other allies like Australia.
Taiwan cannot become a tradable commodity. Unification of Taiwan without formal and willing consent must remain a red line issue for US allies and partners.
From a deterrent perspective, as Ukraine has taught us, this must start with Taiwan itself.
This means supporting Taiwan to focus on mobile, asymmetric denial; survivability; and mobilisation readiness — not traditional force-on-force parity.
This especially requires enough stocks to inflict crippling losses on amphibious forces within the first 72 hours, neutralising or disrupting landings before a beachhead is established.
Urgent and significantly increased defence spending — from Taiwan’s current 2.4% of GDP to levels more akin to those of Israel (4.2% in 2022) will be necessary to establish a credible deterrent and maintain the committed support of US allies and partners.
That said, Taiwan is making progress in enhancing its defence capabilities through procurement and collaboration with the US. This includes:
Completed deliveries of 400 Javelin anti-tank missiles;
Delivery of Stinger missiles with additional orders placed, and development and deployment of Taiwan’s indigenous Sky Sword II missiles;
Receipt of 29 HIMARS launchers and 84 ATACMS missiles between 2024 and 2027;
Mass production of HF-III anti-ship missiles;
Plans to field 700 military UAVs and 7,000 dual-use drones by 2028, with US support;
Deliveries of mobile Harpoon coastal defence systems;
Deployment, with US assistance, of modern naval mines and minelaying vessels to deter amphibious assaults;
Collaboration with the US on development of unmanned surface and undersea drones, inspired by Ukraine’s usage;
Investment in hardened mobile command centres and expansion of fibre optic infrastructure;
Procurement of advanced radar systems, including L-band and non-L-band mobile radars;
US approval for:
Up to 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles (first batch delivered late 2024);
720 Switchblade 300 loitering munitions in 2024 and 291 ALTIUS 600M-Vs to enhance asymmetric capabilities;
A $75 million upgrade of Taiwan’s tactical datalink systems to improve interoperability with US and Japanese forces;
Real-time intelligence sharing with the Five Eyes alliance, including satellite and aerial ISR data;
A contract to acquire three NASAMS units, with implementation expected by 2034;
Plans to deploy 100 Hsiung Sheng land-attack cruise missiles (1,200 km range), capable of striking deep into mainland China.
Taiwan also benefits from real-time ISR data shared by the US, Japan and Australia, enhancing its early warning and situational awareness capabilities.
Despite this progress, there remains a need to demonstrate greater urgency in removing barriers to investment and accelerating capabilities focused on mobile, asymmetric denial—missiles, drones, and coastal defences—over legacy platforms.
More needs to be done on reserve training, mobilisation, and hardening of C4ISR systems, along with boosting stockpiles of precision munitions, naval mines, and loitering drones
Closing
The rise of CRINK is certainly testing the limits of the post-WWII international system. Despite this, the West retains decisive advantages. Our response must be clear-eyed and unapologetically strategic. It means imposing costs on aggression through integrated deterrence, restoring the credibility of sanctions, reinforcing forward defences—especially in the Indo-Pacific—and ensuring Taiwan is equipped to make invasion too costly to contemplate. It means investing in industrial capacity, critical technologies, and alliance resilience, while preventing the Global South from slipping into neutrality or alignment with autocratic inducements.
This is not a competition over geography. It is a contest over the future of global order. One arc stands for coercion, intimidation, and impunity. The other must stan decisively for sovereignty, liberty, and rules-based peace.
The CRINK arc may be strengthening, but the free world is still stronger if it acts rejects transactional indifference and acts together, with resolve, urgency and strategic clarity.
